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ABSTRACT 
 
Mums and Their Sons, Dads and Their Daughters: 
Panel Data Evidence of Interdependent Marginal Utilities 
across 14 EU Countries*
 
We study how fathers and mothers income satisfaction correlates with the income 
satisfaction of their sons and daughters, as well as with other economic and socio-
demographic variables. We estimate these correlations using data on parents and children in 
households surveyed in the eight waves of the European Community Household Panel-
ECHP (1994-2001) for 14 EU countries. To assess the robustness of these correlations, we 
use siblings in the Panel and we investigate the sensitivity of the estimates with the inclusion 
of other control variables. We also adopt a multi-level random effects ordered probit 
specification, that uses step-parents in the data, to allow us to distinguish nature effects from 
nurture effects. Our main results show evidence of strong altruism effects, but these 
estimated effects differ across countries, differ between mothers and fathers, and differ 
between sons and daughters. 
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1. Introduction 
The extent to which parents are altruistic towards their children is important 
because government policy towards children is usually mediated by the parents. In 
particular, most developed countries provide significant income transfers to parents who 
are motivated by concern for the well-being of their children, especially those in low 
income households. For example, in the US, the recently introduced Child Tax Credit 
(CTC) costs almost $1 billion each week, that is to say, about 0.4% of GNP (Burman 
and Wheaton, 2005). The UK government spends about $25 each week per child in the 
form of a lump sum transfer called Child Benefit (CB) which, together with the UK 
equivalent CTC, accounts for about 1% of GDP (Bradshaw and Finch, 2002). 
Moreover, altruism would suggest a crowding out effect between public and private 
transfers, in such a way that public transfers directly to children would be offset by 
reductions in private transfers (Güth et al., 2002; Kang and Sawada, 2003; Lafferrère 
and Wolff, 2004).1
The aim of this paper is to analyse the extent of altruism between parents and 
their children. To address this, we use responses to questions about satisfaction with 
income as measures of marginal utility.2 An optimising altruistic parent should equate 
the ratio of his/her marginal utility of consumption to that of the child, and to the weight 
of the child’s utility in the parent’s welfare function. In other words, an altruistic parent 
should transfer resources to the child if the parental marginal utility of consumption is 
higher than the weight that the parent places on the child’s welfare, times the child’s 
marginal utility of consumption. Thus, a correlation coefficient between parental and 
child marginal utilities is an estimate of the weight of the child’s utility in the parental 
preferences. 
Altruism is often deduced in the literature from often-problematic data on both 
bequest and inter-vivo transfers, and it would clearly be useful to attempt to substantiate 
these findings using more reliable methods.3 Thus, our approach represents an important 
advance on the previous literature by providing estimates over 14 countries using a rich 
                                                 
1 Interactions between elderly parents and their adult children do not necessarily depend on altruism, but 
can involve elements of the exchange motive (Cox 1987; Cox et al., 1998; Arrondel and Masson, 2001). 
2 Notable studies of individual well-being include Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Frey and Stutzer 
(2002a, 2002b), Layard (2005), Oswald (1997), and Clark and Oswald (2002). Interdependencies between 
levels of well-being of spouses can be found in Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1995) who found a 
negative effect on the well-being of wives having an unemployed husband.  
3 See Altonji et al. (1992, 1996 and 1997) for evidence of intergenerational altruistic links between 
parents and adult children. 
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and internationally comparable dataset, the eight waves of the European Community 
Household Panel-ECHP (1994-2001). This Panel allows us to consider fixed-effect 
estimations and contains information on all individuals within the household. Hence, we 
can consider sibling differences to eliminate family fixed effects. 
In contrast to our work here, which relies on responses to questions about 
satisfaction with income, to measure the marginal utility of consumption, Winkelmann 
(2005) models the intra-family correlation between levels of subjective well-being using 
a hierarchical random effects model. Similarly, Schwarze and Winkelmann (2005) study 
the well-being of parents and its correlation with that of their children older than 16 who 
have moved out of the parental home, using panel data from Germany. While 
correlations between the levels of well-being will be suggestive of altruism, they will 
not, in general, be able to reveal the degree of altruism.  
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we briefly describe the data; 
Section 3 provides the methodology; Section 4 presents some estimates from a variety 
of methods, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
The data used in this work comes from the eight waves of the European 
Community Household Panel-ECHP (1994-2001) for 14 European Countries.4 We 
select families in which either parent  and the children older than 16 still living at home, 
declare non-missing responses to the question about their income satisfaction.5  
The number of observations of children between 16 and 24 years old living in 
the household are given in Table 1, broken down by type of household: both natural 
parents present, only natural father present, only natural mother present, natural mother 
with step-father, and natural father with step-mother.6
                                                 
4 ECHP gives us income information about the previous year, so that we have a final panel composed of 
seven waves. Additionally, we omit Sweden since the Swedish ECHP data do not contain information 
regarding income satisfaction questions. 
5 Household members who leave the original household are not followed in ECHP. We consider the 
impact of this censoring in our subsequent analyses. 
6 After analysing eight age groups (16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25-27, 28-30, 31-33 ….), with the estimation 
results being similar, we have decided to perform our analysis for children from 16 to 24, in order that the 
study is comparable across countries, and that the sample is representative of all European countries. 
However, in our later estimation, we control for this effect by interacting age with child income 
satisfaction, to determine whether parents were more or less altruistic toward children of different ages. 
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(Table 1) 
The specific question we employ, based on individuals’ own perceptions, is: 
“How satisfied are you with your present financial situation?”, with the responses taking 
values from “not satisfied at all” (1) to “completely satisfied” (6).  
With respect to the explanatory variables, our study includes a number of parent 
and child individual characteristics that have proved to be important determinants of 
individual subjective well-being in previous research (Argyle, 1999; Van Praag et al., 
2003; Frijters et al., 2004). Thus, we incorporate economic and socio-demographic 
variables, including the age of the parent and the age squared of the parent (ParentAge, 
ParentAge2), and the education level of the parent and that of the child 
(ParentPrimEduc, ParentSeconEduc, ParentHighEduc, ChildPrimEduc, 
ChildSeconEduc, ChildHighEduc). In addition, we examine two household 
characteristics: the first indicating the number of children under 16 in the household 
(Children<16), and the second indicating whether the household own their flat or house 
(HouseOwnership), with this latter variable being interpreted as a family wealth proxy. 
Introducing logarithmic family income and logarithmic household size is an alternative 
to imposing an arbitrary “income equivalence scale” to account for size effects 
(Schwarze, 2003, 2004; Winkelmann, 2005; Schwarze and Winkelmann, 2005; 
Winkelmann, 2006).7 The study also includes a variable which indicates whether the 
parent and the child are employed or not (ParentEmployed, ChildEmployed), with this 
being among the strongest predictors of a high level of well-being. 
In our dataset it is possible to distinguish between biological and non-biological 
children, so we introduce the possibility of being a step-son or a step-daughter. These 
variables interact with satisfaction of the child and the logarithm of family income, 
which allows us to determine if, and in what direction, there is a significant effect on the 
economic satisfaction of the father or the mother.8
                                                 
7 Household income, net of tax and post transfers, less child net annual income. We introduced family 
income in logarithms since income is related to reported utility in a logarithmic form, but not to true 
utility (Oswald, 2005; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005).  
8 In a later section we will delineate the measurement error between the child sharing the same biological 
parents, and that of being siblings, whether they are biological or step, but live in the same household.  
Literature has studied twin samples, those who are monozygotic and share all genes, and those who are 
dizygotic and just share half of their genes, those who are reared together and whose who grow up 
separately. This allows us to identify if correlations in self-reported subjective well-being are due to 
genetics or to sharing the same family background (Bingley et al., 2005). 
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 Tables 2.a to 2.f show the mean and standard deviation of some relevant 
variables employed in the analyses for four samples (fathers with their sons, fathers 
with their daughters, mothers with their sons and mothers with their daughters), and a 
further two samples (fathers with more than one son or daughter, and mothers with 
more than one son or daughter). In these two latter samples, we use fixed and random 
effect estimations to model the existence of siblings in a household, as well as the 
presence of siblings sharing the same parents, which allows us to distinguish between 
biological or “nature” effects, as opposed to the “nurture” effects of simply growing up 
in the same household. 
(Tables 2.a-2.f) 
The variables we list in these Tables are income satisfaction declared by the 
parent (Parent Inc Sat), as well as income satisfaction of the child between 16 and 24 
years living in the household (Child Inc Sat). We also show the satisfaction of the child 
between 16 and 24 recorded in the year they take the decision to leave home (Child Sat 
Leaves home), so that, in the following year, they are no longer in the sample. We 
consider the satisfaction recorded by the parent in the year the child takes such a 
decision (Parent Sat Child Leaves home).9 We then consider the mean of the family 
income in PPP in order to make cross-country comparisons (Log Fam Inc) 10, the 
percentage of households in the sample that experience a windfall (Windfall)11, the 
proportion of the child income compared with the rest of the household income 
(Proportion), as well as the percentage of married parents (Parent married), the 
percentage of employed parents (Parent employed), and the percentage of step-parents 
(Step). Additionally, we employ the percentage of children who take the decision to 
leave home in each sample (% Children Leave Home), as well as the average age of 
taking such a decision (Average Age Child Leaves). In the last column, we show the 
number of observations in each country for the different samples. 
                                                 
9 We can compare these last satisfaction indicators with the mean of the satisfaction declared by the 
individuals whose children do not leave home, confirming that this is only slightly smaller. Thus, there 
does not seem to be any pattern of satisfaction and it does not appear that less satisfied individuals or 
children of non income-satisfied parents are the ones who leave home. This suggests that there is no 
selection by observables in our samples, and we subsequently show that our results do not appear to be 
overly sensitive to the age range of the children, thus suggesting that there is little selection by 
unobservables. 
10 Purchasing Power Parity rates are used to convert income variables into a common indicator which 
allows us to compare the purchasing power of families across countries. 
11 The household inherits or receives gift or lottery winnings worth 2000 € or more. 
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In these Tables we observe that, in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, parents 
declare satisfaction levels of around 3 points, with higher satisfaction reported in the 
rest of the countries and similar results for the four parents-children samples. Children 
declare lower satisfaction levels in Greece and Italy than in Portugal, Spain and in the 
rest of the countries. 
Other variables, such as the logarithm of family income, are very similar in each 
of the countries for the four samples, although life standards are very heterogeneous in 
each of the countries. We have found significant differences between countries in the 
ratio of the child’s income to the income of the other members of the household, with 
higher ratios in Austria, Italy, Portugal and Spain, and lower ratios in France and the 
Netherlands. We observe that, for the daughter samples, both for fathers and mothers, 
the portion the daughter contributes to the rest of the family income is smaller than the 
son’s portion. The proportion of individuals who benefit from windfalls is quite high in 
Denmark and the Netherlands, very small in Austria and Portugal, and in the rest of the 
countries is around 1 or 2 percent of individuals that receive such a positive income 
shock. 
We also observe that most of the parents in our analysis are married or 
cohabiting. The percentage of employed fathers in the sample is very high, whereas for 
the mothers-sons and daughters samples the percentage of employed mothers is smaller. 
The proportion of step-sons and step-daughters in the father samples is similar but is, 
again, very heterogeneous across countries, being very high in the United Kingdom but 
low in Denmark and France. In the two fathers samples, there are more step-children 
than in the samples of mothers, as children tend to stay with biological mothers and 
when the mothers re-marry, the step-father lives in the existing household of the current 
wife.  
The proportion of children who leave the household, and are not in the 
household the following year, is very high in Luxembourg but very low in Greece.  
When we observe the proportion of daughters who leave home it is similar to that of 
sons, being very high in Italy and lower in Denmark and the Netherlands, but we will 
show a gender difference in the average age they took such a decision. Daughters take 
the decision of leaving home earlier than sons in both the fathers and mothers samples. 
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 3. Methodology 
Theoretical Model 
In order to model the altruistic links between parents and their children, we 
follow the basic approach of Becker (1991) subsequently developed by Schwarze 
(2004) and Schwarze and Winkelmann (2005). Let W(.) denote parental utility, where 
we assume that the parent is altruistic, while the child c is egoistic, and that this welfare 
function is additively separable: 
( ) ( ) ( ),p c p cW W q q U q V qη= = + . 
where  is the utility the parent derives from its own consumption,  is the utility 
the parent derives from the child, in such a way that the parent considers the child utility 
in his utility function,  is the amount both parent and child consume i = p, c; and 
( )U ( )V
iq η  is 
the weight the parent gives the child in his utility function. We will distinguish p = m, f 
to indicate whether the parent is the father (adult male) or the mother (adult female), and 
we will distinguish c = s, d to indicate if the child is a son or a daughter. 
Following Chiappori (1988), cooperative behaviour within the household  
implies that household members pool their incomes and will, in general, satisfy the 
Pareto optimality conditions. Thus, we would expect optimising altruistic parents to set 
 where λ is the marginal utility of consumption, p indicates parents and c 
indicates child. The direct data on λ should allow this relationship to be estimated and so 
reveal an estimate of η and hence test the hypothesis that η = 0 (egoism) against the 
alternative η > 0 (altruism). This hypothesis can be tested directly without observing 
consumption data, on the assumption that survey responses to the question about 
subjective income satisfaction are direct measures of marginal utilities. 
c
i
p
i ηλλ =
Empirical Models 
Estimating this equilibrium relationship will reveal the degree of altruism and no 
issue of endogeneity arises, since this is simply an equilibrium relationship. However, 
we would expect to improve the precision of the estimates, if we include other variables, 
to control for heterogeneity in preferences that may be correlated between parents and 
children. Thus, we add  βix  to control for socio-economic characteristics, that is to say, 
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household income, size and composition, as well as education level and employment 
status of the parent, in order to proxy the parent consumption.  
We also estimate panel models with individual specific effects to address the 
problem of omitted variables, that is to say, unobserved variation in parental 
consumption that is not in βix , but is correlated with the child’s consumption. Thus, we 
estimate: 
p c
i i i i ix eλ β ηλ α= + + +   
Since satisfaction variables are discrete, we estimate ordered probit models. 
Moreover, we exploit the panel nature of the data to include fixed effects. Finally, we 
estimate a mixed (fixed effects and random effects) model that accounts for the 
presence of siblings in the data.12
The random effects ordered probit model (see Appendix 1) is written as:  
 
1 21 2 3
* *
it it it it it
p p p c c
i iy x x x yβ β β η α= + + + + + te
                                                
 
where  is the latent realisation of the marginal utility of income (subjective income 
satisfaction) of parent i. Subjective satisfaction is explained by a vector of individual 
characteristics, , which includes parental income , characteristics of the child, 
, which include his/her income, as well as the son’s/daughter’s own income 
satisfaction. 
*p
it
y
p
it
x
1
p
it
x
2
c
it
x
The parametric ordered probit model with multiple random effects (see 
Appendix 2) is given by:  
1 21 2 3
* *
ijht ijht ijht ijht ijht
p p p c c
h jh ijh ijhty x x x y a b c eβ β β η= + + + + + + +  
When there is more than one child in the household over 16, the sibling’s 
satisfaction is interrelated, for genetic or family background reasons. We break down 
the long-term correlation into a part that is shared between members of the same 
household (siblings), and a part that is specific to the child (the individual effect). The 
household effect measures the correlation in long-term well-being between siblings of 
the same household. These correlations can be identified in the panel, and repeated 
measurements are available for different siblings of the same family. Other evidence 
 
12 We use the GLAMM (Generalised Linear Latent and Mixed Models) add-on to STATA 9. 
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shows that the long-term correlation is indeed related to biological factors and not 
simply to living together; hence, we introduce the effect of sharing the same biological 
parents between siblings. 
 
4. Results 
In Tables 3.a and 3.b we present the estimates of how the income satisfaction of 
the child is correlated with that of the fathers/mothers. We estimate Random Effects 
Ordered Probit Models, as employed in Schwarze (2004).13 Each column of these tables 
represents specifications with an increasing number of control variables and, in general, 
the coefficients are stable, so results are robust for different specifications. In the first 
specification, child satisfaction and the interactions with the variables step, age and 
parent’s education are included. In the second specification, we include income 
variables and household characteristics. In the third specification, we add parents socio-
demographic characteristics to the second specification, and in the fourth, we add to the 
second specification the child’s socio-demographic variables. Finally, in the fifth 
specification we add the total set of controls, parents and children, as well as year 
dummies.  
(Tables 3.a-3.b) 
The results show that the coefficients are highly significant, positive and stable 
for both sexes. We can conclude that the child’s income satisfaction coefficient 
indicates that the degree of altruism from parents to children is positive and statistically 
highly significant in most of the countries, and stable throughout all specifications. This 
altruism coefficient is very high in Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal. Fathers 
care more for their sons than for their daughters in France, Ireland, The Netherlands and 
Spain. However, fathers care more for their daughters than for their sons in Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Italy and The United Kingdom. Mothers care more for their sons 
than their daughters in Ireland, while they care more for their daughters than for their 
sons in Austria, Belgium, Finland and Italy. 
Table 3.c shows the results of the Ordered Probit Model with four error 
components, or multiple random effects, as employed in Lucas et al. (2003a and 
                                                 
13 The model is estimated using STATA 9.1 and the module “REOPROB” by Guillaume R, Frechette (see 
www.econ.Ohio-state.edu/frechette/html/econ.htm). 
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2004).14 We find slightly smaller coefficients that are still positive and significant in all 
countries, for both the altruism coefficient and the family income coefficient. When 
comparing the coefficient of altruism for fathers and mothers, we find that mothers care 
more than fathers for their children in Belgium, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain and The United Kingdom, while the opposite is true in Austria and 
Ireland. 
(Table 3.c) 
In Figures 1.a and 1.b, we present the estimation results from both the simple 
and multiple random effects ordered probit. In every country, the multiple random 
effects coefficients are very close to the simple random effects coefficients, but 
somewhat smaller. This means that the latter, since they do not allow us to break down 
the measurement error between nurture and nature effects, would be an upwardly biased 
estimator. 
(Figures 1.a-1.b) 
In Tables 4.a, 4.b and 4.c we observe the coefficient of the log family income 
variable (annual family income less total income of the child). We find a positive and 
highly significant effect across all specifications in the six samples. Fathers income 
coefficient is higher regarding daughters than sons in Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, The Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Mothers income 
coefficient is higher regarding sons than daughters in Denmark, Finland and Greece, but 
higher regarding daughters than sons in Austria, Germany, Ireland, The Netherlands, 
Portugal and the United Kingdom. Fathers take income into account more than do 
mothers in Austria, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, 
while this effect is higher for mothers than for fathers in Belgium and Finland. The fact 
that fathers give more weight to income than mothers in their utility function, in most of 
the countries, would indicate a different preference structure. This leads us to compare, 
below, the weights they give both to income and to the children in their respective 
utility functions. 
(Tables 4.a-4.c) 
                                                 
14 The model is estimated using STATA 9.1 and the module “GLLAMM”  by S. Rabe-Hesketh, A. 
Pickles and A. Skrondal (see www.gllamm.org). 
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When we compare the altruism coefficient with the income coefficient in all 
samples and specifications of every country, both fathers and mothers care more about 
money than they do for their children, except for Portugal where the altruism coefficient 
is higher than the income coefficient. 
We also present the estimation results for the other controls used.15 The dummy 
variable of being a step-child indicates an ambiguous effect, as in some countries the 
effect is positive whereas in others it is negative. 
When we interact the variable of being a step-child with child’s income 
satisfaction, we discover that it is not often significant for fathers. Fathers are less 
altruistic toward their step-children in Belgium, whether they are sons or daughters, 
toward step-sons in Germany and the United Kingdom, and toward step-daughters in 
Portugal. Austrian mothers are less altruistic toward their step-children when they are 
sons, as is also found for Danish, Finnish, Greek and British mothers. Mothers are less 
altruistic toward their step-children, whether they are sons or daughters, in France and 
Spain, but they are more altruistic toward their step-daughters in Belgium and Portugal.  
We also interact this child income satisfaction variable with the age of the 
individual, in order to identify if fathers and mothers are more or less altruistic toward 
their children when they are 16 to 18, or 19 to 21, rather than 22 to 24 years old.  
This child income satisfaction variable is also interacted with secondary and 
higher education levels of the parent, in order to take into account whether the parent is 
more altruistic when he or she is higher or secondary educated, than when he or she is 
not. The effect is positive and significant for higher and secondary education levels of 
parents in most countries. Higher educated parents not only provide more income, 
because of having better jobs, but they care more regarding their children and provide a 
better education. In the first four samples, fathers and mothers are more altruistic when 
they are secondary and higher educated in Austria, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. In the samples with two or more children over 
16 in the household, highly educated fathers and mothers appear to be more altruistic 
toward their children in Austria, Finland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
When they are secondary educated, both are also more altruistic in Italy, Spain and the 
United Kingdom, and less altruistic in France. 
                                                 
15 These results are not presented here, for space reasons, but are available for readers upon request. 
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We introduce the variable which indicates parent to child age difference in order 
to take into account whether parents do care more regarding their first children, or their 
youngest children, as the parents grow older. The effect differs across countries, in such 
a way that it has a negative effect in Portugal and Spain, where there is a preference for 
those who were first born, and a positive effect in Ireland and the United Kingdom.  
Regarding household characteristics, we also include the log of family size, 
house ownership dummy and number of children under 16 living in the household. In 
most countries, the family size effect is negative in every sample, that is to say, the 
more people living in the household, the less satisfied are fathers and mothers, as found 
in Schwarze, (2004), and Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Van Praag (2003). Being an owner, 
rather than a tenant, influences both fathers and mothers in a positive way in the four 
samples in France, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United 
Kingdom (Schwarze, 2004; Stanovnik, 1992; Headey and Wooden, 2004). France, the 
Netherlands and Germany show a lower proportion of households owning their own 
house or flat as compared to the large proportion of home owners in Greece, Ireland, 
Italy and Spain. In the last two samples, previously defined, where at least two children 
older than 16 are in the household, both fathers’ and mothers’ income satisfaction 
decreases in Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, as it does for 
mothers in the UK. 
The higher the number of children under 16, the more income satisfied are 
fathers in the fathers-daughters samples of Austria, mothers in the mothers-daughters 
samples of France and Italy, and mothers in the mothers-sons sample of Germany. The 
effect is negative for fathers in the fathers-sons samples of Belgium, Denmark, Italy and 
Portugal, in mothers in the mothers-sons samples of Denmark, Greece, Ireland and 
Spain, and in mothers in the mothers-daughters sample in Spain. In the last two 
samples, we found a positive effect in fathers’ and mothers’ income satisfaction in 
Germany, but a negative effect in Portugal, and a negative effect in Italian fathers and 
Danish mothers. 
When the family income variable is interacted with the variable of being a step-
child, we found a negative effect in Irish fathers, and Belgian and Danish mothers, as 
well as in the fathers-sons sample in Italy, in the fathers-daughters samples of Ireland 
and the United Kingdom, and in the mothers-sons samples of Germany and the United 
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Kingdom. We found a positive effect in the mothers-sons samples in Portugal and The 
Netherlands. 
The higher the child income regarding family income, that is, the annual family 
income less total income of the individual, the more income satisfied are fathers and 
mothers generally, in all samples, in Austria, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the 
United Kingdom, and also in the first four samples in France and Greece. The parent is 
happier the more income the child has, given altruism and positive sentiments regarding 
the child, because the child is less dependent on the parents’ money. This could be seen 
as evidence of the bargaining power of the child in the household. 
The exogenous and unexpected income shock, that is, a windfall (the household 
inherits, receives a gift or lottery winnings worth 2000 € or more) has a positive effect 
on fathers-sons income satisfaction in Denmark, France, Greece and The Netherlands, 
and also in the fathers-daughters sample in Ireland. We found this effect in the mothers-
sons sample in France, Greece, The Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom, and in 
the mothers-daughters sample in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom. In the last 
two samples of at least two children over 16 at home, we found this effect on fathers 
income satisfaction in France and Spain, with the same effect appearing in mothers 
income satisfaction in Denmark, Greece, The Netherlands and Spain. 
We observe the effect of the set of parental variables introduced, in order to 
proxy parents consumption. We find a U-Shaped effect in Austrian and Danish fathers, 
as well as in the fathers-sons sample in Portugal, the mothers-sons sample in France, 
and the mothers-daughters samples of Ireland and The Netherlands (Clark et al., 1996). 
In the last two samples, we find this effect in Austrian fathers. Additionally, an inverted 
U-Shape is found for mothers in the UK.  
The effect of higher education on fathers income satisfaction is positive, that is 
to say, those who are higher educated are more income satisfied (Clark and Oswald, 
1994, 1996). In the last two samples, with at least two children over 16 at home, a 
secondary educated father is more income satisfied in Austria, but is less income 
satisfied in Greece. By contrast, a higher educated father is more income satisfied in 
Belgium and the Netherlands. A secondary educated mother is more income satisfied in 
France and less income satisfied in the Netherlands, whereas a highly educated mother 
is more income satisfied in Denmark, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, and less 
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income satisfied in Finland. When the father reaches secondary or higher education, he 
is more income satisfied in Ireland, and when both mothers and fathers reach secondary 
or higher education levels, they are more income satisfied in Italy. 
The father being employed increases his income satisfaction in most of the 
countries, while the mother being employed increases her income satisfaction in France, 
Italy, The Netherlands and Spain, as it does in the mothers-sons samples of Denmark, 
Germany and Portugal, and in the mothers-daughters samples of Belgium, Finland and 
Ireland. 
When analysing the samples with more than two children, we found a positive 
effect in both fathers and mothers income satisfaction in Finland, Ireland, Italy and 
Portugal. Also, fathers are more satisfied in Austria, France, Spain and the United 
Kingdom, as are mothers in Germany. 
When both sons and daughters are higher or secondary educated, fathers are 
more income satisfied in Spain. Fathers are more income satisfied when both sons and 
daughters are only secondary educated in Austria and Greece, and only higher educated 
in Belgium. When the son is secondary educated, fathers income satisfaction decreases 
in Luxembourg. When the son is higher educated, fathers income satisfaction decreases 
in Italy and the Netherlands, but increases in Greece. Mothers are more income satisfied 
when their sons are secondary educated in Belgium, Italy and Portugal, and when their 
daughters are secondary educated in Austria, Greece and Spain. When the son is higher 
educated, the mothers income satisfaction increases in Belgium, Ireland and Spain, and 
when the daughter is highly educated, the mothers income satisfaction increases in The 
Netherlands and Spain. 
Whether the child is employed affects parents income satisfaction in a negative 
way. This is apparent for fathers in Greece and Portugal, fathers-daughters samples in 
Austria and Spain, mothers in Greece, Italy and Portugal, and mothers in the daughters 
samples of Austria and Spain. The employed children live at home and earn wages, but  
nevertheless continue to spend household resources. The effect is positive in mothers-
daughters samples in Germany and the United Kingdom, where they can be considered 
more independent and live on the wages they earn. When analysing the samples with 
more than two children in the household, we find a negative effect in both fathers and 
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mothers income satisfaction, when their child is employed, in Austria and Portugal. This 
negative effect also applies to fathers in Finland and mothers in Italy. 
Having a female adult partner in the household decreases fathers income 
satisfaction in Belgium, and in one specification in France. Having a male adult partner 
in the household increases mothers income satisfaction in all countries, except for 
Denmark and Luxembourg. 
In the Generalised Linear Latent and Mixed Models (GLLAMM) we use the 
variable child gender in order to identify whether they are son or daughter, and to 
determine if fathers and mothers are more satisfied when the child is male, as in 
Belgium and Portugal, or if they are more satisfied when the child is female, as in 
Denmark, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom. When we interact the child gender 
variable with child income satisfaction, we find that fathers and mothers are more 
altruistic toward daughters in Belgium, fathers are more altruistic toward daughters in 
Germany, and mothers are more altruistic toward daughters than toward sons in 
Denmark, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Portugal. 
Schwarze and Winkelmann (2005) estimate models in differences to eliminate 
potential endogeneity. Here, we estimate an equilibrium condition, so the question of 
endogeneity does not arise. However, we can confirm that parental changes are 
significantly affected by changes in satisfaction of their children.16   
Finally, in Tables 5.a-5.c and Figures 2.a-2.c, we present money metrics 
estimations of child welfare by taking the estimated altruism parameter and dividing it 
by the income parameter. We then scale the result by the standard deviation of child 
satisfaction, to get an estimate of the willingness of parents to pay for a one standard 
deviation change in child satisfaction.17 These estimates can be interpreted as the 
proportion of income that parents are willing to give up for a standard deviation increase 
in child satisfaction. Fathers are willing to pay more to increase daughters satisfaction, 
rather than sons, in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, and the 
United Kingdom. Mothers will pay more to increase sons satisfaction, rather than 
                                                 
16  As there is an increase in the measurement error when we estimate in differences, since we are treating 
the variable satisfaction as continuous, the parameters of all coefficients would be lower than the ones 
estimated from the levels data. Therefore, this estimator should be considered a lower boundary. 
17 For similar calculations in a different context see Clark and Oswald (2002), Blanchflower and Oswald 
(2004), Oswald and Powdthavee (2005), Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1995, 1998), Oswald (1997) and 
Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004).  
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daughters, in Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal and 
the United Kingdom, while they will pay more to increase daughters satisfaction, rather 
than sons, in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Italy and Spain. 
(Tables 5.a-5.c and Figures 2.a-2.c) 
When we compare fathers and mothers willingness to pay to increase their child 
income satisfaction by one standard deviation in the last two samples, with at least two 
children in the household, we find that mothers do care more than fathers in Austria, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Our aim has been to analyse the existence and degree of altruism from parents 
toward their children, using responses to questions about income satisfaction as 
measures of marginal utility of consumption. The altruism coefficient is the correlation 
between parental and child marginal utilities, that is, an estimate of the weight of the 
child’s utility in the parental preferences. We observe strong altruism effects, but these 
effects differ across countries, differ between mothers and fathers and between sons and 
daughters. We have confirmed the presence of significant altruism between parents and 
children. In general, we find that mothers seem more altruistic toward their sons than 
toward their daughters, for instance in Ireland, and fathers seem more altruistic toward 
their daughters than toward their sons in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy and the UK. 
In Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal parents are very altruistic. Although in 
Spain individuals report higher satisfaction levels, they break the Southern European 
pattern regarding altruism.  
Our aim has been to model altruism using the framework of an ordered probit 
model with multiple random effects (unobserved child-individual effect, sharing the 
same parents effect, and the effect of being siblings or belonging to the same 
household). These three levels allow us, not only to address the problem of unobserved 
individual heterogeneity, but also to distinguish between those family shocks that 
siblings experience, and which are correlated for either genetic reasons, or due to the 
fact of being reared together. After taking into account such effects, we have found that 
mothers care more than fathers regarding their children in Belgium, Greece, Italy, the 
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Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, while the opposite is true in 
Austria and Ireland. 
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Table 1. Sample sizes 
 Number of observations Both natural Only father Only mother Step father Step mother 
Austria 5908 82.08% 1.74% 12.15% 2.74% 1.29% 
Belgium 4468 72.36% 3.25% 18.04% 4.34% 2.01% 
Denmark 2296 73.48% 4.05% 14.59% 5.53% 2.35% 
Finland 4067 77.13% 4.33% 13.70% 3.52% 1.33% 
France 9857 75.99% 3.11% 14.08% 5.17% 1.64% 
Germany 11372 83.97% 3.27% 10.96% 1.51% 0.29% 
Greece 10229 88.76% 1.15% 9.84% 0.22% 0.02% 
Ireland 9601 85.25% 3.31% 10.97% 0.45% 0.02% 
Italy 17917 89.48% 1.45% 8.51% 0.42% 0.15% 
Luxembourg 4605 75.68% 2.28% 14.88% 4.19% 2.98% 
The Netherlands 5667 84.12% 2.84% 12.56% 0.07% 0.41% 
Portugal 12520 81.26% 1.77% 14.67% 1.54% 0.76% 
Spain 17798 84.57% 2.08% 12.26% 0.83% 0.26% 
United Kingdom 7327 63.74% 4.93% 21.61% 7.92% 1.82% 
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Table 2.a. Fathers-Sons 
 
 
Parent Inc 
Sat Child Inc Sat Log Fam Inc Proportion Shock 
Parent 
Married 
Parent 
Employed Step 
% Children 
Leave Home 
Age Average 
Child Leaves
Parent Sat 
Child Leaves 
Child Sat 
Leaves 
Home 
Nº 
Observations
4.13907            3.876744 10.33714 0.3323241 0.0093023 0.9762791 0.8130233 0.027907 0.1164506 24.06142 3.982332 3.827957
Austria 
(1.350494) (1.479555) (0.5358871) (2.962071) (0.0960213) (0.1522137) (0.3899836) (0.1647447) (0.3208003) (5.381956) (1.491003) (1.5475) 
1881 
4.084756            
   
            
            
            
            
            
            
  
            
            
   
            
            
    
            
    
            
  
3.885976 10.38504 0.1147767 0.0567073 0.954878 0.8695122 0.0554878 0.0588 24.19728 3.865854 3.725
Belgium 
(1.277108) (1.41673) (0.5525894) (0.5697142) (0.2313531) (0.2076349) (0.3369421) (0.2289997) (0.2352971) (4.816694) (1.244863) (1.458064) 
848 
4.488757 4.036686 10.30354 0.1423637 0.104142 0.8804734 0.9266272 0.0710059 0.1619128 21.16062 4.590643 4.079755
Denmark 
(1.14533) (1.444003) (0.4424387) (0.3965172) (0.3056256) (0.3245993) (0.2609018) (0.2569868) (0.3685254) (3.055068) (1.249341) (1.418492) 
560 
3.912243 3.748646 10.18869 0.1754817 0.0888407 0.9252438 0.872156 0.0303359 0.1306002 22.19094 3.893023 3.6
Finland 
(1.300714) (1.373631) (0.4830839) (2.219436) (0.284668) (0.2631402) (0.334097) (0.1716027) (0.3370338) (4.688247) (1.157139) (1.305641) 
615 
3.41267 3.263914 10.16142 0.085938 0.0218005 0.929982 0.829187 0.0620672 0.0700201 23.53938 3.362934 3.059524
France 
(1.288841) (1.407798) (0.5901613) (1.325741) (0.1460502) (0.25521) (0.3763938) (0.2413085) (0.2552021) (4.138771) (1.290821) (1.461467) 
2229 
3.85 3.406944 10.19973 0.1876636 0.0263889 0.9736111 0.8986111 0.0208333 0.1112092 23.22109 3.751592 3.293578
Germany 
(1.212934) (1.405218) (0.5176951) (0.238228) (0.1604003) (0.1604003) (0.3020528) (0.1429254) (0.3144108) (4.581447) (1.264857) (1.380007) 
592 
3.078334 2.765785 9.590383 0.2512114 0.0136233 0.9887346 0.8108462 0.0112654 0.0248716 25.6422 3.445545 3.025316
Greece 
(1.172222) (1.160429) (0.8161564) (1.067799) (0.1159362) (0.1055528) (0.391682) (0.1055528) (0.1557428) (5.445199) (1.203954) (1.13199) 
1483 
3.557342 3.154465 10.22351 0.2446223 0.0135421 0.955565 0.7697842 0.0080406 0.1518828 23.53112 3.582329 3.088305
Ireland 
(1.453918) (1.466334) (0.636472) (0.7445038) (0.1156044) (0.2061032) (0.42106) (0.0893272) (0.3589355) (4.527069) (1.473525) (1.420739) 
1781 
3.246234 2.747853 9.865724 0.3411786 0.0164719 0.9864846 0.744615 0.003942 0.1018107 26.14937 3.325123 2.869852
Italy 
(1.245003) (1.335424) (0.8016453) (3.376673) (0.1272905) (0.1154757) (0.4361081) (0.0626659) (0.3024089) (4.989333) (1.279665) (1.437773) 
2815 
3.978022 3.664835 10.61818 0.1616205 0.0384615 0.9395604 0.8186813 0.0274725 0.1852672 25.53064 4.17284 3.675
Luxembourg 
(1.394369) (1.524306) (0.5156586) (0.2456785) (0.1928382) (0.2389568) (0.3863448) (0.1639067) (0.388568) (4.982998) (1.348982) (1.438837) 
116 
4.507163 3.980352 10.20418 0.1079873 0.1031519 0.9619321 0.8964388 0.0008187 0.0436482 22.62687 4.663158 4.106383The 
Netherlands (1.050842) (1.323426) (0.5034347) (0.2610242) (0.3042194) (0.1913995) (0.3047528) (0.0286065) (0.2043444) (3.643248) (0.9295449) (1.273958) 
1476 
3.10744 3.033917 9.464327 0.4194238 0.0054705 0.9553611 0.8245077 0.0175055 0.1021672 24.578 2.981481 3.025263
Portugal 
(1.041306) (1.080249) (0.769627) (1.984595) (0.073768) (0.2065324) (0.3804293) (0.1311594) (0.3028854) (4.806051) (1.061834) (1.10015) 
2737 
3.185331 3.040903 9.801431 0.5226019 0.0156559 0.9719323 0.754725 0.0087447 0.0558368 24.94505 3.069832 2.974212
Spain 
(1.371602) (1.456093) (0.7957047) (13.2742) (0.1241488) (0.1651779) (0.4302805) (0.09311) (0.2296151) (5.367614) (1.387473) (1.518817) 
3481 
3.770192 3.650156 10.22766 0.2643506 0.0102633 0.9348505 0.8121374 0.1039714 0.168023 23.12678 3.700873 3.581176United 
Kingdom (1.136381) (1.163761) (0.574156) (0.3990114) (0.1008091) 0.2468445) (0.3906896) (0.3052916) (0.3739314) (4.543296) (1.138177) (1.140433) 
1936 
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Table 2.b. Fathers-Daughters 
 
 
Parent Inc 
Sat Child Inc Sat Log Fam Inc Proportion Shock 
Parent 
Married 
Parent 
Employed Step 
% Children 
Leave Home 
Age Average 
Child Leaves
Parent Sat 
Child Leaves 
Child Sat 
Leaves 
Home 
Nº 
Observations
3.982215            3.825588 10.3658 0.2467143 0.0131956 0.9546758 0.8605852 0.0246701 0.1492876 22.58568 3.977707 3.865815
Austria 
(1.449583) (1.509058) (0.5237057)    
            
   
            
  
            
            
     
            
            
  
            
  
            
            
            
   
            
   
            
            
  
(2.25971) (0.1141446) (0.2080738) (0.3464783) (0.1551622) (0.3564294) (4.681106) (1.448635) (1.42591) 
1398 
4.142084 3.90866 10.45844 0.07004 0.0514208 0.9276049 0.8782138 0.0548038 0.057561 22.24576 3.788235 3.744186
Belgium 
(1.259806) (1.413416) (0.5565406) (0.3363259) (0.2209293) (0.2592287) (0.3271494) (0.2276739) (0.2329682) (3.89814) (1.328211) (1.321194) 
664 
4.575365 3.996759 10.35919 0.0813237 0.0988655 0.904376 0.9659643 0.089141 0.1784512 20.45912 4.493151 3.930556
Denmark 
(1.084682) (1.464955) (0.3699051) (0.2792685) (0.2987235) (0.2943135) (0.1814679) (0.2851784) (0.3831071) (3.509016) (1.255315) (1.624346) 
351 
4.02019 3.81829 10.22157 0.1023938 0.0771971 0.932304 0.888361 0.0391924 0.1385176 20.08333 4.010811 3.512658
Finland 
(1.236896) (1.416397) (0.4352032) (1.002874) (0.2670626) (0.2513728) (0.3151089) (0.1941678) (0.3455474) (2.74417) (1.206816) (1.324619) 
534 
3.456669 3.306392 10.1425 0.0921219 0.0199754 0.9287031 0.8451137 0.047941 0.0835873 22.22396 3.482517 3.288809
France 
(1.263767) (1.40062) (0.5610936) (0.3440535) (0.1399372) (0.2573596) (0.3618519) (0.2136743) (0.276798) (3.687088) (1.28611) (1.460712) 
1847 
3.867117 3.376126 10.22637 0.1605163 0.027027 0.9797297 0.8851351 0.018018 0.1105096 21.58277 3.819945 3.433803
Germany 
(1.182223) (1.464545) (0.4297018) (0.235716) (0.1623451) (0.1410823) (0.3192185) (0.1331665) (0.3135532) (4.006328) (1.230736) (1.360453) 
366 
3.104923 2.758945 9.67324 0.1641294 0.0126446 0.9865483 0.8092548 0.0045736 0.0292407 23.99432 3.020619 2.895349
Greece 
(1.179421) (1.193589) (0.7255861) (0.7386304) (0.1117501) (0.1152143) (0.3929415) (0.0674825) (0.1684946) (5.005708) (1.198779) (1.301845) 
1329 
3.452979 2.996553 10.21507 0.1912629 0.0152634 0.9739045 0.7641556 0.0073855 0.162653 22.66262 3.516393 3.150442
Ireland 
(1.472784) (1.484398) (0.5633542) (0.3462941) (0.1226289) (0.1594587) (0.42463) (0.0856422) (0.3690852) (4.219985) (1.508272) (1.482918) 
1503 
3.229299 2.743359 9.943296 0.1495441 0.016778 0.9853969 0.7778468 0.0066801 0.1080083 25.06686 3.104938 2.759317
Italy 
(1.240849) (1.341712) (0.7163353) (1.354309) (0.1284487) (0.1199669) (0.4157259) (0.0814649) (0.3104034) (4.765738) (1.272017) (1.369346) 
2069 
4.230769 3.852071 10.64612 0.2113956 0.0295858 0.9289941 0.816568 0.0414201 0.2008597 23.75875 4.27027 3.864865
Luxembourg 
(1.367131) (1.506537) (0.4194625) (0.2957142) (0.1699452) (0.257598) (0.3881704) (0.199852) (0.4007216) (4.372982) (1.15031) (1.348) 
111 
4.463298 3.965682 10.20292 0.0828712 0.0753098 0.9680648 0.8884652 0.0028599 0.045584 20.24107 4.563107 4.126214The 
Netherlands (1.058533) (1.34571) (0.4650739) (0.1790002) (0.2639535) (0.1758695) (0.3148683) (0.0534139) (0.2086237) (3.213837) (0.893) (1.226182) 
1181 
3.148343 3.006049 9.551833 0.1827437 0.0076276 0.9673856 0.8250921 0.013151 0.1069542 24.02136 2.953947 2.871397
Portugal 
(1.049966) (1.07553) (0.7095491) (0.8275681) (0.0870137) (0.1776486) (0.3799383) (0.1139361) (0.309077) (4.935907) (1.144536) (1.098019) 
1749 
3.142625 2.961058 9.79638 0.403661 0.0160636 0.9725783 0.7532046 0.0097355 0.0573384 24.19839 3.082857 2.792023
Spain 
(1.34852) (1.469734) (0.8123025) (14.84869) (0.1257304) (0.163322) (0.4311816) (0.0981952) (0.2324988) (5.141079) (1.386175) (1.438072) 
2864 
3.756867 3.665108 10.30439 0.1956181 0.0111046 0.936879 0.85564 0.0900058 0.189781 21.72203 3.721198 3.704492United 
Kingdom (1.091931) (1.146341) (0.5067745) (0.4561869) (0.1048224) (0.2432515) (0.3515572) (0.2862738) (0.3921928) (4.060144) (1.124229) (1.075427) 
1464 
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Table 2.c. Mothers-Sons 
 
 
Parent Inc 
Sat Child Inc Sat Log Fam Inc Proportion Shock 
Parent 
Married 
Parent 
Employed Step 
% Children 
Leave Home 
Age Average 
Child Leaves
Parent Sat 
Child Leaves 
Child Sat 
Leaves 
Home 
Nº 
Observations
4.073559            3.88394 10.27685 0.3494272 0.0102166 0.8720883 0.5835717 0.0130772 0.1107498 24.17271 4.041401 3.729904
Austria 
(1.412877) (1.489544) (0.5758849) (2.752028) (0.1005801) (0.3340598) (0.4930671) (0.1136288) (0.3138521) (5.420506) (1.44158) (1.542214) 
2149 
3.98944            
            
            
            
            
  
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
    
            
3.821542 10.31106 0.1173889 0.0549102 0.8400211 0.5675818 0.0216473 0.0678426 24.505 3.777778 3.915094
Belgium 
(1.381676) (1.445557) (0.5701528) (0.5476632) (0.2278651) (0.3666833) (0.4955425) (0.1455675) (0.2515183) (4.456374) (1.32787) (1.428405) 
987 
4.427455 3.997768 10.2376 0.1559428 0.1026786 0.8158482 0.8225446 0.03125 0.1906585 21.18072 4.618182 4.056604
Denmark 
(1.274277) (1.466191) (0.4599346) (0.3968687) (0.3037081) (0.3878244) (0.382267) (0.1740898) (0.3929708) (3.61943) (1.317129) (1.409717) 
587 
3.823009 3.728614 10.15088 0.0960931 0.0825959 0.8761062 0.8151426 0.0088496 0.1291811 22.5119 3.885246 3.431507
Finland 
(1.265122) (1.372931) (0.4913818) (0.9878151) (0.2754058) (0.3296225) (0.3883728) (0.093701) (0.3354647) (4.804212) (1.287462) (1.413763) 
675 
3.366251 3.235561 10.09389 0.0952314 0.019932 0.8314836 0.582786 0.0156285 0.0745115 24.05088 3.25 3.096774
France 
(1.311029) (1.412211) (0.6236338) (1.247802) (0.1397826) (0.3743666) (0.4931547) (0.1240475) (0.2626207) (4.545775) (1.395562) (1.427362) 
2585 
3.767949 3.369231 10.0919 0.2578155 0.025641 0.9038462 0.5230769 0.0089744 0.1117485 23.69815 3.728745 3.253247
Germany 
(1.297276) (1.415874) (0.6589319) (0.6263267) (0.1581633) (0.2949913) (0.4997877) (0.0943676) (0.3150749) (4.853375) (1.281521) (1.399853) 
652 
2.953177 2.745581 9.563391 0.256641 0.013139 0.907549 0.4476828 0.0052556 0.0294029 26.58362 2.947368 2.774194
Greece 
(1.165496) (1.16439) (0.7805114) (1.543419) (0.1138837) (0.2896962) (0.4973148) (0.0723135) (0.1689415) (5.456303) (1.246887) (1.260857) 
1649 
3.582615 3.127514 10.16584 0.2767347 0.0179598 0.8990661 0.2873563 0.0007184 0.15254 23.7573 3.531108 3.04034
Ireland 
(1.475759) (1.458213) (0.6752172) (0.8065982) (0.132829) (0.3012953) (0.4526105) (0.026798) (0.3595686) (4.78348) (1.575898) (1.423386) 
2133 
3.107414 2.729631 9.824925 0.3250457 0.0159811 0.9236311 0.3661252 0.0014409 0.0963002 26.4994 3.256803 2.894378
Italy 
(1.258427) (1.337756) (0.8073022) (2.787931) (0.1254105) (0.2656048) (0.4817758) (0.0379346) (0.295011) (5.043235) (1.276323) (1.409046) 
3080 
4.062827 3.575916 10.60689 0.1512355 0.0471204 0.8795812 0.4659686 0.0052356 0.178117 25.66104 4.125 3.643678
Luxembourg 
(1.390278) (1.557071) (0.4939429) (0.2294744) (0.2124533) (0.326306) (0.5001515) (0.0723575) (0.3826555) (5.021738) (1.354537) (1.470461) 
119 
4.484998 3.939613 10.15388 0.1197604 0.1052032 0.8997341 0.4417015 0.0049373 0.041987 22.11972 4.327434 3.946903The 
Netherlands (1.134171) (1.337358) (0.5193251) (0.3988721) (0.3068733) (0.3004112) (0.496684) (0.0701058) (0.2005891) (3.958082) (1.263799) (1.294499) 
1587 
2.924813 3.014739 9.399031 0.4569175 0.0059701 0.8367537 0.5169776 0.011194 0.0920292 24.79094 2.797642 2.955466
Portugal 
(1.081378) (1.086125) (0.7907711) (1.896951) (0.0770429) (0.3696247) (0.4997583) (0.1052178) (0.2890809) (4.867583) (1.023501) (1.076223) 
3329 
3.170548 3.015985 9.7453 0.592767 0.0151038 0.8860919 0.3011957 0.0036501 0.0533556 25.52941 2.940678 2.855422
Spain 
(1.358921) (1.451766) (0.8338646) (15.232) (0.1219737) (0.3177196) (0.4588064) (0.0603094) (0.2247491) (5.537869) (1.375375) (1.455337) 
3978 
3.746385 3.626251 10.14875 0.3522174 0.0103819 0.836485 0.6611049 0.0148313 0.1642663 23.33412 3.717668 3.513566United 
Kingdom (1.125396) (1.160563) (0.6288457) (3.761989) (0.1013801) (0.3699035) (0.4734219) (0.1208997) (0.3705531) (4.873218) (1.206157) (1.196195) 
2303 
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Table 2.d. Mothers-Daughters 
 
 
Parent Inc 
Sat Child Inc Sat Log Fam Inc Proportion Shock 
Parent 
Married 
Parent 
Employed Step 
% Children 
Leave Home 
Age Average 
Child Leaves
Parent Sat 
Child Leaves 
Child Sat 
Leaves 
Home 
Nº 
Observations
3.937989            3.819177 10.30746 0.2770008 0.0140698 0.880667 0.5992705 0.009901 0.1469839 22.73796 3.985795 3.811966
Austria 
(1.515925) (1.499436) (0.5737963) (2.251484) (0.1178096) (0.3242644) (0.490174) (0.0990357) (0.35414) (4.902202) (1.464615) (1.42186) 
1545 
3.961121            
            
   
            
  
            
            
   
            
    
            
            
            
  
            
     
            
            
            
  
3.8502 10.33588 0.0851398 0.049171 0.8176101 0.6077759 0.030303 0.0577386 23.15278 3.776596 3.585106
Belgium 
(1.373448) (1.402179) (0.6146701) (0.3038706) (0.2162867) (0.386276) (0.4883858) (0.1714689) (0.2332952) (4.276001) (1.400109) (1.306803) 
813 
4.532951 4.057307 10.27562 0.103229 0.1017192 0.8008596 0.8581662 0.0157593 0.1986234 20.25248 4.417989 4.016043
Denmark 
(1.151222) (1.425182) (0.43239) (0.292496) (0.3024954) (0.3996402) (0.3491298) (0.1246323) (0.3991601) (3.285823) (1.279916) (1.550151) 
415 
4.010132 3.716312 10.15915 0.0690026 0.0881459 0.8682877 0.810537 0.0091185 0.1440129 20 3.79661 3.457143
Finland 
(1.235832) (1.415134) (0.4329948) (0.3497154) (0.2836507) (0.3383491) (0.3920746) (0.0951029) (0.3511976) (3.209478) (1.349921) (1.388435) 
628 
3.385687 3.27752 10.08521 0.1182025 0.0188473 0.8331057 0.5697897 0.018301 0.0853404 22.32667 3.386167 3.253731
France 
(1.273459) (1.410542) (0.5840969) (1.072717) (0.1360042) (0.3729324) (0.4951731) (0.1340559) (0.2794141) (3.656455) (1.387656) (1.463562) 
2064 
3.739044 3.360558 10.13244 0.1887955 0.0239044 0.8864542 0.5916335 0.0099602 0.1116169 21.60876 3.671533 3.3675
Germany 
(1.297022) (1.447511) (0.521538) (0.301127) (0.1529037) (0.3175753) (0.4920219) (0.0994014) (0.3149211) (4.040204) (1.29413) (1.386452) 
415 
2.993122 2.746745 9.580179 0.2874985 0.0132646 0.9066568 0.4296242 0.0007369 0.0312184 24.93981 3.138889 2.8125
Greece 
(1.138969) (1.197653) (0.786178) (4.157915) (0.1144195) (0.2909485) (0.4950833) (0.0271396) (0.17392) (5.196697) (1.342743) (1.378882) 
1510 
3.512377 3.040864 10.16159 0.2488985 0.0180747 0.9056974 0.2777996 0.0027505 0.1648506 22.89126 3.531401 3.172962
Ireland 
(1.522352) (1.498394) (0.6092119) (1.466881) (0.1332477) (0.2923066) (0.4480021) (0.0523832) (0.3710783) (4.489155) (1.522221) (1.48964) 
1918 
3.086957 2.720907 9.893413 0.1633642 0.0166451 0.921653 0.3788205 0.0020089 0.105532 25.32993 2.998534 2.75
Italy 
(1.279828) (1.345687) (0.7296018) (1.4072) (0.127947) (0.2687361) (0.4851281) (0.0447789) (0.3072487) (4.845661) (1.283007) (1.369915) 
2309 
4.093407 3.774725 10.5813 0.2080181 0.032967 0.8736264 0.532967 0.032967 0.1890482 24.16897 4.053333 3.773333
Luxembourg 
(1.46301) (1.540904) (0.461322) (0.2895009) (0.1790428) (0.3331866) (0.5002883) (0.1790428) (0.3916108) (4.601464) (1.334504) (1.361372) 
121 
4.448574 3.949438 10.1315 0.1232497 0.0769231 0.8993086 0.4511668 0.0116681 0.0407501 20.85841 4.291667 3.938144The 
Netherlands (1.140456) (1.36301) (0.548171) (1.366056) (0.266527) (0.3009848) (0.4977172) (0.1074102) (0.1977464) (3.256497) (1.213231) (1.375488) 
1302 
2.998863 2.994998 9.483522 0.2231937 0.0081855 0.8556162 0.5682128 0.005457 0.0978299 24.14748 2.814371 2.862069
Portugal 
(1.07073) (1.091232) (0.7669961) (1.069188) (0.0901132) (0.3515185) (0.4953815) (0.0736782) (0.297102) (5.089695) (1.100669) (1.086335) 
2092 
3.093931 2.9246 9.71275 0.2568837 0.0162682 0.8736738 0.3131985 0.0031122 0.0540777 24.55965 2.917127 2.796562
Spain 
(1.362529) (1.465256) (0.8444446) (3.604903) (0.1265141) (0.3322401) (0.4638271) (0.055704) (0.22618) (5.255891) (1.392017) (1.408672) 
3348 
3.728689 3.624198 10.18131 0.2264056 0.0119157 0.8203483 0.6516957 0.0197067 0.1909561 22.17727 3.746296 3.62279United 
Kingdom (1.133336) (1.163372) (0.5875813) (0.4495369) (0.1085315) (0.3839851) (0.4765422) (0.1390223) (0.3931053) (4.531997) (1.139803) (1.122055) 
1867 
 
 
 
 
 27
 
 
 
 
Table 2.e. Fathers 
 
 
Parent Inc 
Sat Child Inc Sat Log Fam Inc Proportion Shock 
Parent 
Married 
Parent 
Employed Step 
% Children 
Leave Home 
Age Average 
Child Leaves
Parent Sat 
Child Leaves 
Child Sat 
Leaves 
Home 
Nº 
Observations
4.036332            3.857555 10.38245 0.3015408 0.011534 0.9714533 0.849481 0.0282584 0.1236576 23.03722 3.934236 3.869396
Austria 
(1.405972) (1.499315) (0.5182756) (2.706105) (0.1067908) (0.1665527) (0.357631) (0.165734) (0.3292157) (4.985056) (1.480993) (1.493639) 
2915 
4.018416            
   
          
            
            
   
            
   
            
  
            
   
            
    
            
            
    
            
            
            
(1.023557) 
3.701657 10.50906 0.0668045 0.06814 0.9152855 0.8563536 0.0589319 0.080415 21.69355 3.5 3.647059
Belgium 
(1.259514) (1.423102) (0.516088) (0.1901901) (0.2522183) (0.2787132) (0.3510542) (0.2357143) (0.2721112) (3.59229) (1.370167) (1.411716) 
273 
4.151786 4.005952 10.3459 0.165202 0.1160714 0.8333333 0.9107143 0.0625 0.21881 20.65789 4.144231 3.732673
Denmark 
(1.28279) (1.482221) (0.4769354) (0.5597663) (0.3207883) (0.3732338) (0.285581) (0.2424225) (0.4138368) (3.591605) (1.210137) (1.522439) 
239 
3.835165 3.659341 10.21653 0.0810397 0.0641026 0.952381 0.8626374 0.014652 0.1143641 20.4 3.739583 3.475
Finland 
(1.298669) (1.391084) (0.3718522) (0.129739) (0.2451602) (0.2131541) (0.3445454) (0.1202656) (0.3183987) (3.376866) (1.2247) (1.292383) 
414 
3.291181 3.144759 10.30169 0.0776471 0.0116473 0.8976705 0.7670549 0.1006656 0.1307401 21.99174 3.119565 3.050279
France 
(1.333013) (1.394294) (0.567817) (0.2281966) (0.1073368) (0.3032072) (0.4228835) (0.3010106) (0.337207) (3.385338) (1.337499) (1.522394) 
778 
3.844988 3.395105 10.2686 0.1589562 0.0244755 0.983683 0.9055944 0.0221445 0.2150272 21.85517 3.771475 3.339012
Germany 
(1.209831) (1.449685) (0.4507844) (0.2035583) (0.1546103) (0.1267655) (0.2925627) (0.1472393) (0.410892) (4.014323) (1.265667) (1.388358) 
706 
3.085083 2.865193 9.763775 0.1678075 0.0176796 0.9966851 0.7690608 0.0121547 0.0614589 25.43925 3.22 2.847826
Greece 
(1.168563) (1.157676) (0.6650756) (0.5200698) (0.1318567) (0.0575116) (0.4216667) (0.1096369) (0.2402392) (5.406456) (1.217056) (1.094783) 
390 
3.489096 3.093341 10.29703 0.2047367 0.015993 0.9630707 0.7749346 0.0087235 0.1666667 22.70621 3.523923 3.150721
Ireland 
(1.453501) (1.461055) (0.5854944) (0.6308517) (0.1254664) (0.1886158) (0.4176861) (0.0930047) (0.3726994) (4.15145) (1.473324) (1.453418) 
2669 
3.219345 2.716788 9.929058 0.2386631 0.0173498 0.9856676 0.7698433 0.0051965 0.1004033 25.4113 3.174721 2.770093
Italy 
(1.244501) (1.32833) (0.7559472) (2.69473) (0.1305763) (0.118862) (0.4209507) (0.0719025) (0.3005433) (4.871591) (1.290809) (1.392699) 
4193 
4.059937 3.700315 10.66951 0.1779433 0.0347003 0.9337539 0.8201893 0.0378549 0.188113 24.40876 4.19403 3.789474
Luxembourg 
(1.416294) (1.532899) (0.4477182) (0.2573658) (0.183309) (0.2491049) (0.3846369) (0.1911469) (0.3908407) (4.725643) (1.259416) (1.409129) 
207 
4.559896 3.960938 10.23217 0.1288097 0.1354167 0.9895833 0.8802083 0.0104167 0.0717391 21.45455 4.814815 4The 
Netherlands (1.089497) (1.46001) (0.6301453) (0.2705505) (0.3426145) (0.1016616) (0.3251414) (0.1016616) (0.2583364) (3.2891) (0.7862783) (1.270978) 
272 
3.125294 3.003872 9.553989 0.2771395 0.0058083 0.9643203 0.8339096 0.0156272 0.1035321 24.01981 2.975369 2.953634
Portugal 
(1.052067) (1.086182) (0.7115631) (1.472904) (0.075996) (0.1855032) (0.3721875) (0.1240366) (0.3046642) (4.737799) (1.107929) (1.106207) 
3861 
3.02585 2.941156 9.805068 0.4863908 0.0173469 0.9544218 0.6867347 0.0115646 0.0897392 24.27725 3.014815 2.834559
Spain 
(1.389705) (1.490222) (0.8517584) (12.79972) (0.1305826) (0.2086041) (0.4639002) (0.1069335) (0.2858323) (5.211026) (1.450472) (1.538623) 
1566 
3.816685 3.811822 10.29416 0.2419476 0.936401 0.8316498 0.0976431 0.1718476 22.1465 3.788591 3.760611United 
Kingdom (1.000033) (0.9591871) (0.5205118) (0.3346447)  (0.2440828) (0.374247) (0.296887) (0.3772893) (4.016254) (0.9647232)
2467 
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Table 2.f. Mothers 
 
 Parent Inc Sat Child Inc Sat Log Fam Inc Proportion Shock 
Parent 
Married 
Parent 
Employed Step 
% Children 
Leave Home 
Age Average 
Child Leaves
Parent Sat 
Child Leaves 
Child Sat 
Leaves Home
Nº 
Observations
3.980869        3.865047 10.32498 0.3290041 0.012151 0.8839193 0.60212 0.0108583 0.1203977 23.09152 3.993092 3.807292 
Austria 
(1.463157) (1.499207) (0.5613616) (2.625047) (0.1095739) (0.320363) (0.4895237) (0.1036494) (0.3254479) (5.113734) (1.465858) (1.475368) 
3275 
3.729614            
    
            
       
            
            
            
   
            
            
            
            
   
            
            
            
            
     
3.655222 10.36078 0.0827098 0.0629471 0.7753934 0.4949928 0.0672389 0.0825688 23.20988 3.339623 3.26
Belgium 
(1.465895) (1.413154) (0.554625) (0.2892097) (0.2430416) (0.4176218) (0.5003329) (0.2506146) (0.2753697) (4.094863) (1.616542) (1.509291) 
360 
4.295699 4.043011 10.24689 0.1824298 0.1021505 0.7419355 0.7849462 0.0645161 0.2685338 20.32515 4.289474 3.813333
Denmark 
(1.314929) (1.505884) (0.5337684) (0.5520983) (0.303254) (0.438159) (0.411413) (0.246001) (0.4435623) (3.24871) (1.315378) (1.498933) 
265 
3.792722 3.575949 10.18371 0.0945449 0.0727848 0.8844937 0.7753165 0.0094937 0.1232539 20.90667 3.698413 3.388235
Finland 
(1.27256) (1.403163) (0.3961231) (0.1605448) (0.2599887) (0.3198852) (0.4177043) (0.0970487) (0.3288636) (4.166576) (1.328276) (1.328211) 
474 
3.16029 3.100264 10.20328 0.0974524 0.0105541 0.7440633 0.5402375 0.0204485 0.1186147 22.57664 3.090909 3.036458
France 
(1.3345) (1.400321) (0.6234701) (0.2201434) (0.1022233) (0.4365304) (0.4985428) (0.1415755) (0.3234046) (3.580007) (1.501883) (1.484201) 
978 
3.754595 3.365405 10.18587 0.2025726 0.0205405 0.9221622 0.532973 0.0118919 0.2137821 22 3.728507 3.302839
Germany 
(1.283129) (1.44693) (0.5819364) (0.5268297) (0.1419169) (0.2680612) (0.4991815) (0.1084582) (0.4100214) (4.132007) (1.290876) (1.396144) 
768 
2.904427 2.814889 9.71436 0.1617059 0.0160966 0.8983903 0.4215292 0.0637768 25.375 2.984848 2.806452
Greece 
(1.15292) (1.177987) (0.6560596) (0.4597437) (0.1259104) (0.3022864) (0.4940525)  (0.2444158) (5.617745) (1.208845) (1.225932) 
406 
3.547418 3.096479 10.24174 0.2284774 0.0204225 0.8971831 0.27277 0.0016432 0.1675626 22.99758 3.498179 3.123223
Ireland 
(1.49833) (1.465046) (0.6130435) (0.7483061) (0.1414572) (0.3037552) (0.4454358) (0.0405077) (0.3734964) (4.463052) (1.545569) (1.458474) 
3348 
3.070904 2.693011 9.885679 0.2298167 0.0168856 0.9276892 0.3650719 0.0014071 0.0962207 25.68785 3.094708 2.765201
Italy 
(1.273261) (1.332333) (0.7653731) (2.212973) (0.1288477) (0.259012) (0.4814691) (0.0374868) (0.2948993) (4.941479) (1.289917) (1.369842) 
4610 
4.062874 3.610778 10.64766 0.1640237 0.0389222 0.8802395 0.5179641 0.0209581 0.1778767 24.65524 4.092199 3.75
Luxembourg 
(1.447458) (1.555192) (0.4447257) (0.2431578) (0.1936997) (0.3251684) (0.5004269) (0.1434589) (0.3824404) (4.815882) (1.325038) (1.424983) 
214 
4.313397 3.899522 10.21104 0.1239533 0.1411483 0.9090909 0.3971292 0.0095694 0.0475248 20.45833 4.5 4.181818The 
Netherlands (1.282557) (1.496423) (0.5318794) (0.2223876) (0.3485917) (0.2878243) (0.4898895) (0.0974707) (0.2129694) (2.992442) (0.9636241) (1.220319) 
306 
2.948113 2.989269 9.486501 0.3103764 0.0064858 0.8444575 0.5396226 0.0079009 0.0939873 24.26291 2.788262 2.899764
Portugal 
(1.084863) (1.094542) (0.7413409) (1.446132) (0.0802779) (0.3624424) (0.498457) (0.0885406) (0.2918201) (4.871348) (1.060954) (1.075914) 
4708 
3.001463 2.904009 9.753414 0.4900462 0.0187299 0.8448932 0.2718759 0.0046825 0.0891518 24.71197 2.826498 2.755776
Spain 
(1.371015) (1.479021) (0.8556166) (11.92564) (0.1355893) (0.3620595) (0.4449914) (0.0682782) (0.2849832) (5.549064) (1.420306) (1.484944) 
1849 
3.725559 3.76649 10.19123 0.269586 0.8156655 0.671967 0.0138398 0.1713417 22.43491 3.741935 3.703146United 
Kingdom (1.024907) (0.98976) (0.5863066) (0.3640469) (0.3878139) (0.469566) (0.116843) (0.3768391) (4.366389) (1.081131) (1.030084) 
3107 
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Table 3.a Child Income Satisfaction  
 
Father’s Economic Satisfaction (Sons) Father’s Economic Satisfaction (Daughters) Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.0688 0.0881 0.1080 0.1036 0.1300 0.0968 0.1630 0.2282 0.1919 0.2738 Austria (0.0349)** (0.0340)*** (0.0492)** (0.0361)*** (0.0502)*** (0.0396)** (0.0423)*** (0.0601)*** (0.0448)*** (0.0635)***
0.0011 0.0072 -0.1045 -0.0640 -0.0361 0.0576 0.0458 -0.0051 0.0467 0.0615 Belgium (0.0397) (0.0500) (0.0800) (0.0535) (0.0853) (0.0348)* (0.0537) (0.0761) (0.0612) (0.0764) 
0.1315 0.1164 0.2029 0.1157 0.1935 0.1747 0.1606 0.2401 0.1714 0.3023 Denmark (0.0518)** (0.0602)* (0.0902)** (0.0669)* (0.0933)** (0.0853)** (0.1103) (0.1847) (0.1110) (0.2075) 
0.2089 0.3288 0.2448 0.2385 0.2429 0.2788 0.3277 0.2144 0.1844 0.3492 Finland (0.0505)*** (0.0562)*** (0.0881)*** (0.0661)*** (0.0933)*** (0.0701)*** (0.0859)*** (0.1138)* (0.0932)** (0.1239)***
0.1632 0.2022 0.1829 0.1989 0.2120 0.1463 0.1772 0.1709 0.1801 0.1681 France (0.0217)*** (0.0274)*** (0.0348)*** (0.0286)*** (0.0368)*** (0.0247)*** (0.0320)*** (0.0389)*** (0.0317)*** (0.0396)***
0.1824 0.2045 0.2243 0.2345 0.2527 0.1331 0.0867 0.2408 0.0844 0.2425 Germany (0.0591)*** (0.0616)*** (0.1060)** (0.0632)*** (0.1067)** (0.0767)* (0.0828) (0.1351)* (0.0837) (0.1361)* 
0.4638 0.3697 0.4816 0.4033 0.4680 0.4639 0.4115 0.3931 0.3767 0.4710 Greece (0.0231)*** (0.0360)*** (0.0456)*** (0.0389)*** (0.0463)*** (0.0252)*** (0.0408)*** (0.0492)*** (0.0419)*** (0.0513)***
0.2269 0.2071 0.2486 0.2217 0.2596 0.1773 0.1964 0.2115 0.1569 0.2186 Ireland (0.0246)*** (0.0272)*** (0.0348)*** (0.0296)*** (0.0360)*** (0.0260)*** (0.0294)*** (0.0396)*** (0.0333)*** (0.0411)***
0.3382 0.3127 0.3452 0.3180 0.3540 0.3620 0.3290 0.3488 0.3397 0.3612 Italy (0.0155)*** (0.0215)*** (0.0262)*** (0.0236)*** (0.0275)*** (0.0174)*** (0.0271)*** (0.0317)*** (0.0286)*** (0.0326)***
0.4040 0.4237 0.4340 0.4985 0.5358 0.2939 0.2374 0.5987 0.3009 0.5850 Luxembourg (0.1108)*** (0.1323)*** (0.1640)*** (0.1492)*** (0.1774)*** (0.1071)*** (0.1169)** (0.2367)** (0.1553)* (0.2303)**
0.0903 0.1145 0.0766 0.1286 0.0995 0.0804 0.0753 0.0433 0.0671 0.0259 The Netherlands (0.0300)*** (0.0398)*** (0.0518) (0.0424)*** (0.0520)* (0.0327)** (0.0418)* (0.0558) (0.0427) (0.0557) 
0.4741 0.4976 0.4687 0.4907 0.4873 0.4776 0.4751 0.4833 0.5116 0.5169 Portugal (0.0235)*** (0.0291)*** (0.0332)*** (0.0308)*** (0.0345)*** (0.0268)*** (0.0383)*** (0.0439)*** (0.0397)*** (0.0450)***
0.1875 0.2086 0.2019 0.1738 0.1949 0.2049 0.1749 0.1951 0.1673 0.1545 Spain (0.0133)*** (0.0179)*** (0.0217)*** (0.0191)*** (0.0226)*** (0.0148)*** (0.0201)*** (0.0241)*** (0.0213)*** (0.0248)***
0.1158 0.1360 0.1719 0.1146 0.1776 0.1492 0.1641 0.2081 0.1756 0.2299 United Kingdom (0.0388)*** (0.0412)*** (0.0551)*** (0.0418)*** (0.0553)*** (0.0453)*** (0.0480)*** (0.0702)*** (0.0505)*** (0.0699)***
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. *: indicates individual significance at the 10% level. **: indicates individual significance at the 5% level. ***: 
indicates individual significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 3.b Child Income Satisfaction 
 
 
Mother’s Economic Satisfaction (Sons) Mother’s Economic Satisfaction (Daughters) Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.1630 0.1675 0.1762 0.2028 0.2034 0.1780 0.2044 0.2313 0.2227 0.2606 Austria (0.0270)*** (0.0275)*** (0.0372)*** (0.0301)*** (0.0384)*** (0.0332)*** (0.0350)*** (0.0507)*** (0.0379)*** (0.0517)***
0.1004 0.1476 0.1055 0.0862 0.0964 0.1569 0.2738 0.2496 0.2131 0.3271 Belgium (0.0306)*** (0.0444)*** (0.0611)* (0.0451)* (0.0626) (0.0319)*** (0.0477)*** (0.0629)*** (0.0504)*** (0.0629)***
0.1836 0.2064 0.2210 0.1802 0.1455 0.0287 0.0894 0.0699   
Denmark (0.0471)*** (0.0645)*** (0.0891)** (0.0611)*** (0.0842)* (0.0738) (0.1327) (0.1504)   
0.1926 0.2189 -0.0450 0.1596 -0.0176 0.2653 0.2909 0.2838 0.2708 0.2238 Finland (0.0529)*** (0.0570)*** (0.0901) (0.0653)** (0.0885) (0.0673)*** (0.0733)*** (0.1049)*** (0.0730)*** (0.1036)**
0.1682 0.1719 0.1760 0.2097 0.1639 0.1656 0.1891 0.1831 0.1849 0.2292 France (0.0197)*** (0.0250)*** (0.0315)*** (0.0275)*** (0.0329)*** (0.0224)*** (0.0274)*** (0.0338)*** (0.0293)*** (0.0356)***
0.2432 0.2054 0.2105 0.2195 0.2290 0.2618 0.1919 0.2282 0.1568 0.1795 Germany (0.0469)*** (0.0458)*** (0.0731)*** (0.0499)*** (0.0745)*** (0.0791)*** (0.0827)** (0.1103)** (0.0849)* (0.1125) 
0.5845 0.5697 0.5729 0.5685 0.5973 0.5598 0.5887 0.5377 0.5947 0.5659 Greece (0.0220)*** (0.0349)*** (0.0404)*** (0.0364)*** (0.0420)*** (0.0233)*** (0.0376)*** (0.0446)*** (0.0397)*** (0.0469)***
0.1919 0.1801 0.2120 0.1994 0.2166 0.1591 0.1421 0.0990 0.1453 0.1034 Ireland (0.0230)*** (0.0262)*** (0.0325)*** (0.0271)*** (0.0331)*** (0.0227)*** (0.0243)*** (0.0340)*** (0.0272)*** (0.0353)***
0.3744 0.3507 0.4037 0.3805 0.4275 0.4508 0.4140 0.4325 0.4497 0.4639 Italy (0.0143)*** (0.0198)*** (0.0236)*** (0.0219)*** (0.0250)*** (0.0163)*** (0.0261)*** (0.0298)*** (0.0276)*** (0.0308)***
0.2946 0.3284  0.3997  0.1528 0.2477 0.3521 0.2931 0.3984 Luxembourg (0.0901)*** (0.1033)***  (0.1088)***  (0.0965) (0.1326)* (0.1496)** (0.1316)** (0.1590)**
0.1347 0.1090 0.1423 0.2054 0.1546 0.1307 0.1533 0.1874 0.1388 0.1858 The Netherlands (0.0280)*** (0.0361)*** (0.0467)*** (0.0374)*** (0.0477)*** (0.0308)*** (0.0407)*** (0.0553)*** (0.0422)*** (0.0558)***
0.4751 0.5202 0.5211 0.5221 0.5456 0.5690 0.5188 0.5221 0.5434 0.5474 Portugal (0.0208)*** (0.0257)*** (0.0297)*** (0.0271)*** (0.0307)*** (0.0241)*** (0.0331)*** (0.0378)*** (0.0343)*** (0.0388)***
0.2418 0.2447 0.2240 0.2578 0.2162 0.2680 0.2834 0.2697 0.2566 0.2590 Spain (0.0124)*** (0.0167)*** (0.0198)*** (0.0178)*** (0.0204)*** (0.0137)*** (0.0190)*** (0.0223)*** (0.0199)*** (0.0227)***
0.1560 0.1849 0.2078 0.1828 0.2129 0.2265 0.1898 0.2374 0.1725 0.2175 United Kingdom (0.0340)*** (0.0354)*** (0.0465)*** (0.0368)*** (0.0465)*** (0.0379)*** (0.0429)*** (0.0575)*** (0.0440)*** (0.0574)***
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. *: indicates individual significance at the 10% level. **: indicates individual significance at the 5% level. ***: 
indicates individual significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 3.c Child Income Satisfaction 
 
Father’s Economic Satisfaction  Mother’s Economic Satisfaction  Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.0772 0.0943 0.1387 0.1207 0.1657 0.0767 0.0738 0.0995 0.0817 0.1115 Austria (0.0354)** (0.0373)** (0.0456)*** (0.0395)*** (0.0466)*** (0.0290)*** (0.0328)** (0.0398)** (0.0332)** (0.0410)***
0.0552 0.0686 0.1792 0.0585 0.2321 0.1741 0.2053 0.2178 0.2368 0.2395 Belgium (0.0695) (0.1157) (0.1514) (0.1290) (0.1419) (0.0758)** (0.1146)* (0.1223)* (0.1100)** (0.1235)* 
     0.3259 0.0622 0.8027 0.4691 0.7606 Denmark      (0.2084) (0.3152) (0.4042)** (0.3738) (0.4138)* 
.2593405** 0.1989 0.0082 0.2080 0.0122 0.2141 0.3074 -0.0293 0.1677 -0.0188 Finland (0.1012049) (0.1274) (0.1539) (0.1283) (0.1577) (0.1134)* (0.1777)* (0.1712) (0.1306) (0.1778) 
0.1992 0.2002 0.1778 0.2368 0.1623 0.2074 0.1985 0.2419 0.2314 0.2474 France (0.0664)*** (0.0790)** (0.0886)** (0.0794)*** (0.0897)* (0.0561)*** (0.0680)*** (0.0678)*** (0.0692)*** (0.0776)***
0.1727* 0.1188 0.3338 0.2751 0.3299 0.1776 0.2077 0.1502 0.2044 0.1448 Germany 0.0942 (0.1005) (0.1386)** (0.1120)** (0.1389)** (0.0802)** (0.0884)** (0.1059) (0.0917)** (0.1070) 
0.3666 0.2960 0.2503 0.2964 0.2644 0.5557 0.5058 0.5530 0.5350 0.5831 Greece (0.0764)*** (0.1164)** (0.1462)* (0.1190)** (0.1469)* (0.0781)*** (0.1268)*** (0.1457)*** (0.1289)*** (0.1449)***
0.1278 0.1246 0.1535 0.1134 0.1433 0.0999 0.1049 0.0827 0.0927 0.0823 Ireland (0.0275)*** (0.0311)*** (0.0366)*** (0.0324)*** (0.0376)*** (0.0268)*** (0.0288)*** (0.0326)** (0.0303)*** (0.0335)**
0.3103 0.3182 0.3283 0.3239 0.3360 0.3746 0.3427 0.3784 0.3745 0.4032 Italy (0.0167)*** (0.0271)*** (0.0291)*** (0.0279)*** (0.0297)*** (0.0159)*** (0.0257)*** (0.0279)*** (0.0266)*** (0.0286)***
     0.1379 0.3312 0.2855 0.3322 0.2661 Luxembourg      (0.1363) (0.1613)** (0.1668)* (0.1668)** (0.1721) 
0.1208 0.1162 0.1423 0.0999 0.1251 0.2272 0.3735 0.3103 0.4193 0.3328 The Netherlands (0.0914) (0.1145) (0.1347) (0.1159) (0.1390) (0.0812)*** (0.1075)*** (0.1248)** (0.1129)*** (0.1277)***
0.4209 0.4605 0.4731 0.4733 0.4900 0.4573 0.4643 0.4967 0.4807 0.5136 Portugal (0.0259)*** (0.0377)*** (0.0409)*** (0.0386)*** (0.0417)*** (0.0238)*** (0.0339)*** (0.0364)*** (0.0346)*** (0.0370)***
0.2067 0.1851 0.1689 0.1684 0.1661 0.2917 0.2730 0.2607 0.2630 0.2588 Spain (0.0292)*** (0.0404)*** (0.0442)*** (0.0416)*** (0.0454)*** (0.0272)*** (0.0355)*** (0.0370)*** (0.0369)*** (0.0384)***
0.1641 0.1413 0.0685 0.1414 0.0619 0.1972 0.1796 0.2737 0.1823 0.2695 United Kingdom (0.0568)*** (0.0588)** (0.0731) (0.0597)** (0.0736) (0.0465)*** (0.0512)*** (0.0604)*** (0.0538)*** (0.0607)***
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. *: indicates individual significance at the 10% level. **: indicates individual significance at the 5% level. ***: 
indicates individual significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.a 
 
Simple and Multiple Random Effects Ordered Probit (Fathers) 
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Figure 1.b 
 
Simple and Multiple Random Effects Ordered Probit (Mothers)
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Table 4.a Family Income in Logarithms 
 
 Father’s Economic Satisfaction (Sons) Father’s Economic Satisfaction (Daughters) 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.5633 0.5891 0.5690 0.5733 0.8324 0.8576 0.8574 0.8234 Austria (0.0849)*** (0.0851)*** (0.0855)*** (0.0849)*** (0.1051)*** (0.1084)*** (0.1109)*** (0.1114)*** 
0.8393 0.6333 0.5587 0.6593 0.5705 0.2754 0.4228 0.0036 Belgium (0.1502)*** (0.1624)*** (0.1619)*** (0.1479)*** (0.1548)*** (0.1479)* (0.1518)*** (0.1522) 
0.8349 0.7466 0.7619 0.6331 0.8588 0.7862 0.8092 0.6682 Denmark (0.2170)*** (0.2288)*** (0.2248)*** (0.2223)*** (0.3244)*** (0.3700)** (0.3303)** (0.3731)* 
1.1334 0.9904 1.1911 1.0732 1.7668 1.3515 1.5766 1.0918 Finland (0.1658)*** (0.1637)*** (0.1868)*** (0.1756)*** (0.2640)*** (0.2427)*** (0.2569)*** (0.2499)*** 
0.8953 0.8161 0.8947 0.8558 0.9120 0.9199 0.9868 0.8559 France (0.0782)*** (0.0816)*** (0.0794)*** (0.0839)*** (0.0881)*** (0.0936)*** (0.0885)*** (0.0888)*** 
0.6871 0.7060 0.6955 0.7186 1.3001 1.1958 1.2342 1.1796 Germany (0.1449)*** (0.1487)*** (0.1467)*** (0.1503)*** (0.2295)*** (0.2342)*** (0.2271)*** (0.2338)*** 
0.5974 0.6052 0.5441 0.6125 0.5550 0.5751 0.7090 0.5629 Greece (0.0634)*** (0.0623)*** (0.0578)*** (0.0695)*** (0.0677)*** (0.0688)*** (0.0747)*** (0.0691)*** 
0.8227 0.6592 0.7990 0.6815 0.8237 0.6353 0.8789 0.5657 Ireland (0.0822)*** (0.0831)*** (0.0831)*** (0.0836)*** (0.0920)*** (0.1007)*** (0.1004)*** (0.1000)*** 
0.5189 0.4686 0.5001 0.4660 0.5384 0.4599 0.5108 0.4676 Italy (0.0440)*** (0.0446)*** (0.0442)*** (0.0447)*** (0.0585)*** (0.0591)*** (0.0583)*** (0.0594)*** 
0.6328 0.5092 0.7198 0.3839 1.1291 0.9078 0.2854 0.2821 Luxembourg (0.3792)* (0.3570) (0.4279)* (0.4190) (0.4313)*** (0.5497)* (0.6481) (0.6465) 
0.4153 0.5117 0.5355 0.4933 0.7399 0.5194 0.8746 0.6063 The Netherlands (0.0983)*** (0.1092)*** (0.1175)*** (0.1014)*** (0.1260)*** (0.1257)*** (0.1282)*** (0.1171)*** 
0.5228 0.4604 0.4742 0.4439 0.5260 0.4847 0.5235 0.4981 Portugal (0.0517)*** (0.0528)*** (0.0536)*** (0.0533)*** (0.0730)*** (0.0741)*** (0.0739)*** (0.0740)*** 
0.4140 0.3719 0.3615 0.3600 0.4041 0.4002 0.4172 0.3889 Spain (0.0348)*** (0.0355)*** (0.0354)*** (0.0350)*** (0.0361)*** (0.0389)*** (0.0370)*** (0.0378)*** 
1.0854 0.8716 1.0149 0.8860 1.2446 1.1659 1.1944 1.1319 United Kingdom (0.1028)*** (0.1076)*** (0.1096)*** (0.1076)*** (0.1167)*** (0.1342)*** (0.1324)*** (0.1241)*** 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. *: indicates individual significance at the 10% level. **: indicates individual significance at the 5% level. ***: 
indicates individual significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.b Family Income in Logarithms 
 
 
 Mother’s Economic Satisfaction (Sons) Mother’s Economic Satisfaction (Daughters) 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.4445 0.4926 0.4519 0.4804 0.6046 0.6107 0.6060 0.5921 Austria (0.0735)*** (0.0741)*** (0.0745)*** (0.0745)*** (0.0902)*** (0.0952)*** (0.0929)*** (0.0946)*** 
0.7160 0.5402 0.5355 0.4737 0.6940 0.5608 0.4434 0.7255 Belgium (0.1381)*** (0.1279)*** (0.1301)*** (0.1300)*** (0.1204)*** (0.1743)*** (0.1198)*** (0.1231)*** 
1.8577 1.3700 1.6382 1.4080 1.0085 0.7296   
Denmark (0.2802)*** (0.2416)*** (0.2413)*** (0.2323)*** (0.2751)*** (0.2714)***   
1.5674 1.3835 1.4501 1.3616 1.4742 0.9963 1.1245 0.7873 Finland (0.1880)*** (0.1841)*** (0.1940)*** (0.1875)*** (0.2160)*** (0.2185)*** (0.1964)*** (0.2055)*** 
0.9964 0.7887 0.8276 0.7528 1.0661 0.7629 1.0153 0.8385 France (0.0781)*** (0.0788)*** (0.0761)*** (0.0776)*** (0.0833)*** (0.0783)*** (0.0857)*** (0.0825)*** 
0.8461 0.7705 0.8609 0.7826 1.2371 1.0377 1.0904 0.9877 Germany (0.1155)*** (0.1222)*** (0.1208)*** (0.1242)*** (0.2076)*** (0.2122)*** (0.2085)*** (0.2127)*** 
0.6069 0.5728 0.5808 0.6119 0.4854 0.4313 0.4762 0.5426 Greece (0.0618)*** (0.0596)*** (0.0564)*** (0.0610)*** (0.0585)*** (0.0580)*** (0.0572)*** (0.0584)*** 
0.6212 0.4386 0.4595 0.5074 0.6865 0.5188 0.6252 0.5669 Ireland (0.0677)*** (0.0723)*** (0.0697)*** (0.0706)*** (0.0707)*** (0.0759)*** (0.0752)*** (0.0794)*** 
0.5317 0.4654 0.5125 0.4614 0.5405 0.4511 0.5336 0.4674 Italy (0.0401)*** (0.0408)*** (0.0406)*** (0.0410)*** (0.0554)*** (0.0559)*** (0.0555)*** (0.0561)*** 
1.0379  1.3026  1.6561 1.8878 0.9345 1.7109 
Luxembourg (0.3451)***  (0.3617)***  (0.5164)*** (0.6062)*** (0.5001)* (0.5324)*** 
0.6042 0.6792 0.6374 0.6082 0.9783 0.7940 0.7832 0.7907 The Netherlands (0.0969)*** (0.0996)*** (0.1030)*** (0.0941)*** (0.1223)*** (0.1376)*** (0.1119)*** (0.1259)*** 
0.4087 0.3579 0.3655 0.3438 0.5743 0.5288 0.5515 0.5326 Portugal (0.0445)*** (0.0461)*** (0.0460)*** (0.0464)*** (0.0589)*** (0.0607)*** (0.0597)*** (0.0606)*** 
0.4394 0.3418 0.3979 0.3691 0.4881 0.3446 0.4105 0.3674 Spain (0.0325)*** (0.0321)*** (0.0328)*** (0.0318)*** (0.0352)*** (0.0345)*** (0.0337)*** (0.0364)*** 
0.8439 0.6868 0.7163 0.6463 1.0425 0.7900 0.9126 0.8462 United Kingdom (0.0737)*** (0.0801)*** (0.0741)*** (0.0785)*** (0.0980)*** (0.0949)*** (0.1043)*** (0.1073)*** 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. *: indicates individual significance at the 10% level. **: indicates individual significance at the 5% level. ***: 
indicates individual significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.c Family Income in Logarithms 
 
 
 Father’s Economic Satisfaction  Mother’s Economic Satisfaction 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.4970 0.5042 0.4966 0.4962 0.2575 0.2894 0.2804 0.2864 Austria (0.0770)*** (0.0793)*** (0.0812)*** (0.0798)*** (0.0725)*** (0.0772)*** (0.0752)*** (0.0779)*** 
0.1556 0.2085 0.5249 0.3332 0.7275 0.7229 0.7769 0.7261 Belgium (0.2606) (0.2348) (0.2252)** (0.2224) (0.1830)*** (0.2148)*** (0.1958)*** (0.2223)*** 
    4.1601 2.1749 5.3516 2.3379 Denmark     (1.1388)*** (0.4320)*** (1.0162)*** (0.4825)*** 
1.2311 0.7066 1.2331 0.7414 1.8891 1.9105 1.9982 1.8497 Finland (0.4884)** (0.4147)* (0.4385)*** (0.3776)** (0.4108)*** (0.3934)*** (0.3805)*** (0.4766)*** 
1.1780 0.9457 1.0527 0.9361 1.0718 1.1730 0.9926 0.9114 France (0.2083)*** (0.2000)*** (0.2073)*** (0.2039)*** (0.1629)*** (0.1706)*** (0.1698)*** (0.2174)*** 
0.7051 0.6748 0.7590 0.7046 0.4982 0.3344 0.4171 0.3222 Germany (0.2054)*** (0.2613)*** (0.2580)*** (0.2762)** (0.2242)** (0.2350) (0.2282)* (0.2364) 
0.7886 0.8570 0.8034 0.8183 0.5129 0.4908 0.4466 0.4328 Greece (0.2008)*** (0.2097)*** (0.2060)*** (0.2082)*** (0.2120)** (0.2198)** (0.2284)* (0.2227)* 
0.5295 0.3921 0.4916 0.3906 0.3008 0.2092 0.2469 0.2091 Ireland (0.0864)*** (0.0850)*** (0.0941)*** (0.0853)*** (0.0760)*** (0.0789)*** (0.0773)*** (0.0788)*** 
0.4769 0.4244 0.4623 0.4251 0.4577 0.4167 0.4514 0.4132 Italy (0.0428)*** (0.0427)*** (0.0429)*** (0.0428)*** (0.0401)*** (0.0410)*** (0.0402)*** (0.0417)*** 
    1.0395 1.1459 0.9910 1.1232 Luxembourg     (0.5368)* (0.5129)** (0.5431)* (0.5138)** 
-0.0314 -0.0881 -0.0415 -0.0963 0.0852 0.0518 0.0504 0.0018 The Netherlands (0.2284) (0.2247) (0.2215) (0.2260) (0.2214) (0.2307) (0.2158) (0.2461) 
0.4528 0.3842 0.4154 0.3788 0.4437 0.3870 0.4081 0.3805 Portugal (0.0518)*** (0.0531)*** (0.0531)*** (0.0532)*** (0.0446)*** (0.0461)*** (0.0457)*** (0.0462)*** 
0.4694 0.4127 0.4509 0.4048 0.3924 0.3719 0.3712 0.3521 Spain (0.0666)*** (0.0655)*** (0.0658)*** (0.0656)*** (0.0515)*** (0.0519)*** (0.0526)*** (0.0529)*** 
1.3223 1.2039 1.2354 1.1977 0.8028 0.7421 0.7708 0.7418 United Kingdom (0.1169)*** (0.1202)*** (0.1175)*** (0.1195)*** (0.0967)*** (0.0993)*** (0.1047)*** (0.0996)*** 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. *: indicates individual significance at the 10% level. **: indicates individual significance at the 5% level. ***: 
indicates individual significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table 5.a Fathers money metric of child well-being 
 
Father’s Economic Satisfaction (Sons) Father’s Economic Satisfaction (Daughters) Variables (2) (3) (4) (5) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Austria 11% 12% 12% 15% 13% 18% 15% 22% 
Denmark 10% 19% 11% 21% 13% 21% 14% 31% 
Finland 21% 18% 15% 16% 13% 11% 8% 23% 
France 16% 16% 16% 18% 14% 13% 13% 14% 
Germany 21% 23% 24% 25% 5% 14% 5% 14% 
Greece 53% 69% 64% 66% 62% 57% 45% 70% 
Ireland 17% 26% 19% 26% 16% 22% 12% 26% 
Italy 45% 55% 48% 57% 46% 57% 50% 58% 
Luxembourg 44% 56% 45% 92% 14% 44% 70% 138% 
Netherlands 21% 11% 18% 15% 8% 6% 6% 3% 
Portugal 88% 94% 96% 102% 84% 93% 91% 96% 
Spain 35% 37% 33% 37% 29% 33% 27% 27% 
UK 11% 17% 10% 17% 12% 16% 13% 18% 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.a 
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Table 5.b Mothers money metric of child well-being 
 
Mother’s Economic Satisfaction (Sons) Mother’s Economic Satisfaction (Daughters) Variables (2) (3) (4) (5) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Austria 25% 24% 30% 28% 23% 25% 25% 29% 
Belgium 14% 14% 11% 14% 28% 32% 34% 32% 
Denmark 8% 11% 8% 7% 6% 7%   
Finland 10%  8%  14% 20% 17% 20% 
France 12% 16% 18% 15% 13% 17% 13% 19% 
Germany 17% 19% 18% 21% 11% 15% 10% 13% 
Greece 81% 86% 84% 84% 101% 104% 104% 87% 
Ireland 20% 33% 30% 29% 14% 13% 16% 12% 
Italy 49% 65% 55% 69% 57% 71% 63% 74% 
Luxembourg 20%  20%  10% 12% 20% 15% 
Netherlands 13% 16% 24% 19% 11% 17% 13% 17% 
Portugal 117% 134% 132% 146% 83% 90% 90% 94% 
Spain 38% 45% 45% 40% 40% 53% 43% 48% 
UK 19% 26% 22% 28% 16% 26% 16% 22% 
 
 
Figure 2.b 
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Table 5.c GLLAMM money metric of child well-being 
 
Father’s Economic Satisfaction Mother’s Economic Satisfaction Variables (2) (3) (4) (5) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Austria 13% 18% 16% 22% 19% 23% 19% 26% 
Belgium 31% 60% 8% 49% 20% 21% 22% 23% 
France 12% 13% 16% 12% 13% 15% 17% 19% 
Germany 12% 34% 25% 32% 29% 31% 34% 31% 
Greece 32% 25% 32% 28% 84% 96% 102% 114% 
Ireland 16% 27% 16% 25% 24% 27% 26% 27% 
Italy 50% 58% 53% 60% 56% 68% 62% 73% 
Portugal 94% 113% 105% 119% 96% 117% 108% 123% 
Spain 26% 27% 25% 28% 47% 47% 48% 50% 
UK 11% 6% 12% 5% 23% 37% 24% 37% 
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Appendix 1. Random Effects Ordered Probit 
 
The Random Effects Ordered Probit is given by: 
 
iti
ccppp eyxxxy
ititititit
+++++= αββββ 4321 ** 21  
where  is the latent subjective well-being of the father or the mother.  is a white 
noise error term and 
*p
it
y ite
iα the unobserved heterogeneity of the child that can be treated as a 
random effect, independent of the explanatory variables in the model. 
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c
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51 ,, kk K  are cut points estimated jointly with the β ’s and 4β , the conditional 
probabilities of the ordered responses are given by 
( ) ( ) ( )***,, '5'6 citicitiicititit yxkyxkyxyf itit −−−Φ−−−−Φ= βαβαα  
where  denotes the distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Φ
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Appendix 2. Multiple Random Effects Ordered Probit  
 
The Multiple Random Effects Ordered Probit is given by: 
 
ijhtijhjhh
ccppp ecbayxxxy
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+++++++= 4321 ** 21 ββββ  
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where  is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1. Conditional on the three 
random effects , , , and : 
ijhte
ha jhb ijhc ijhtx
( ) ( ) ( )ijhjhhijhjhhijhjhhijhtijht cbaxkcbaxkcbaxyf ijhtijht −−−−Φ−−−−−Φ= ββ '5'6,,,  
where  denotes the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. 
The threshold parameters  are estimated together with 
Φ
51 ,, kk K β . 
Observations are independent across households. Within siblings, observations 
are not independent, since  is common to all siblings living in the same household 
and time periods,  is common to children who share the same biological parents, and 
 is common to all time periods for a given child. 
ha
jhb
ijhc
=ijhtε ijhtijhjhh ecba +++  
where  is a white noise error term (short-term effect).  is the child specific 
random effect that does not vary over time.  is the child sharing same biological 
parents specific random effect, that does not vary across siblings. Then  is the 
household specific random effect that does not vary across siblings within the family or 
over time. These last three error components are capturing long-term effects. 
 assumes mutually independent and distributed with mean zero 
and constant variances component, where  is normalized to 1. 
ijhte ijhc
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=2εσ 2222 ecba σσσσ +++
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